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Abstract
Machine protection consisting of passive and active sys-
tems will be used to prevent damage during the LHC in-
jection process. Concerning beam 2, parts of the SPS ex-
traction and transfer line beam interlock system has al-
ready been successfully tested during the TI 8 commis-
sioning. Key elements of the final system for beam 2 will
be validated during the LHC Sector Test with low inten-
sity beam, together with parts of the passive protection sys-
tem, the TDI and at least one transfer line collimator TCDI.
The remaining issues after the sector test will be discussed
in detail, where the entire injection protection system to-
gether with post mortem, management of critical settings,
sequencer and software interlocking system must be tested
with beam, for different intensities and filling patterns dur-
ing the LHC beam commissioning. Requirements from
other systems and interdependencies for test modes, such
as inject & dump, are important input for the overall LHC
commissioning strategy and will be discussed.
SYSTEMS CONCERNED
The different systems required for adequate injection
protection are described in detail in [1].
Besides the actual injection into the LHC the injection
protection system also has to cover extraction from the SPS
in LSS4 and LSS6 and the transfer via the transfer lines
TI 2 and TI 8, Fig. 1.
SPS-Extraction Transfer LHC-Injection
Figure 1: Overview of the injection process: extraction
from the SPS in LSS6 and LSS4, transfer via the transfer
lines TI 2 and TI 8 and injection into the LHC in IR 2 and
IR 8.
The machine protection system consists of active
and passive systems - active protection in the form of
surveillance systems and interlocking to inhibit extrac-
tion/injection in case of failure; - passive protection with
collimators and absorbers. The main characteristics of the
protection systems are briefly summarised below.
Passive Protection: TCDI
Transfer line collimators (TCDI) are needed to protect
the LHC aperture, assumed to be 7.5   at 450 GeV, from
any failures upstream of the collimation section. They pro-
vide full phase space coverage with 3 double-jawed colli-
mators per plane and a setting of 4.5  . The expected phase
space coverage was simulated including nominal errors for
setting-up, optics and trajectory and amounts to about 6.9  
maximum amplitudes escaping the system, Fig. 2.
In total there will be seven collimators per line. The
momentum collimator is at the beginning of the lines and
the 6 betatron collimators are located in the last 300 m,
mostly downstream of the last beam dump (TED), Fig. 3.
This means that these TCDI need the LHC beam permit for
setting-up. Concerning the commissioning this means that
the LHC has to be ready to complete the beam commis-
sioning of the collimators. In case of TI 8 the TCDI can
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Figure 2: Expected phase space coverage with TCDI col-
limators as fraction of seeds versus maximum amplitudes
escaping the system.
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Figure 3: The momentum transfer line collimator is at the
beginning of the line, the 6 betatron collimators are located
in the last 300 m.
Passive Protection: TDI-TCDD-TCLI
The other passive protection system involved in the in-
jection process is located in the injection regions in the
LHC and consists of the 4.25 m long injection stopper
TDI, the mask TCDD(M) and the auxiliary collimators
TCLIA/B. This system protects the LHC against injection
kicker (MKI) failures, the required setting is 6.8  .
The TDI will be installed 90Æ downstream of the MKI,
followed by the mask TCDD in front of the superconduct-
ing dipole D1, Fig. 4. The TCLI collimators are located
LHC Project Workshop - 'Chamonix XV'
88
on the other side of the IP and complement the protection
with the TDI in case of phase changes between the injection
stopper and the MKI. TCLIA will be installed downstream
of the experimental area close to the D1 and TCLIB close
to the Q6 downstream of the insertion. A mask (TCLIM)
is required to shield the superconducting quadrupole from
possible showers generated in the collimator jaws.
Figure 4: Horizontal overview of the injection region
around IP2.
Active Protection
Active protection has to guarantee correct settings for
SPS extraction, transfer lines and LHC injection via the
surveillance of e.g.:
  magnet currents with ROCS surveillance and Fast
Magnet Current Change Monitor (FMCM)
  collimator positions
  beam position in SPS extraction region
  SPS extraction septum girder position
  kicker charging voltage
Active protection also has to make sure that high intensity
beam can only be injected into the LHC when beam is al-
ready circulating (beam presence condition). BCT signals
from the SPS and the LHC are required to verify this con-
dition:
  SPS safe beam intensity
  LHC beam presence
These two intensity signals (in the form of flags) along
with the User Inputs from the surveillance systems are in-
put to the Beam Interlock System (BIS) via Beam Interlock
Controllers (BIC). A schematic of the BIS for the injection
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Figure 5: Schematic of the interlock system for the injec-
tion process of beam 2 and CNGS.
Software
Besides hardwired active and passive protection also a
number of software ingredients are required for adequate
injection protection.
Software interlocking system (SIS)
Beam quality aspects like trajectories along the transfer
lines, but also screen positions and other less safety critical
issues are covered by the software interlocking system.
Management of critical setting (MCS)
The MCS is a software to remotely manage interlock set-
tings in a secure way. It needs the SIS for full functionality.
The MCS will be used for a lot of surveillance systems of
devices involved in the injection process, examples are the
MKI, MKE, TDI, TCLI, TCDI, ROCS, BLMs, BPCE and
MSE. The first version of this software is planned to be
ready for the extraction and transfer tests in 2006.
Extraction/transfer/injection data analysis and di-
agnostics
A tool for extraction, transfer and injection data anal-
ysis and diagnostics is required. It will have to cover
shot-by-shot beam quality checks to allow the next ex-
traction/injection as well as post mortem analysis after
abnormal situations e.g. in case of an interlock.
LHC injection sequencer
Setting up of the TDI and TCLI collimators needs to
be driven by the LHC injection sequencer to guarantee
coherency with the different injection preparation and
filling steps. The sequencer will also have to provide the
LHC machine mode inject & dump, which is required for
setting up the transfer line collimators, as will be discussed
below.
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WHEN DO WE NEED INJECTION
PROTECTION?
Injection protection must be in place and working cor-
rectly when the injected intensity exceeds the damage
limit. The damage limit is assumed to be about     
protons at 450 GeV, corresponding to about 5 % of a nom-
inal full batch extracted from the SPS towards the LHC.
According to the “overall commissioning strategy for
protons” [2], injection protection is absolutely mandatory
from commissioning stage II onwards.
Before a beam intensity above the damage limit can
be authorised, formal tests and acceptance of the protec-
tion system performance are needed. Injection protection
should hence be operational for 156 on 156 bunches and be
commissioned at latest during the operation with 43 on 43
bunches.
The only exception are the TCLI collimators. They en-
hance the protection performance against injection kicker
failures, the main protection however is provided by the
TDI. The TCLIs are needed above an injected intensity of
50 % of nominal and can be commissioned later than the
rest of the protection system.
There will also be some earlier milestones before the
LHC start-up. The SPS extraction will be commissioned
with high intensity during the commissioning of CNGS in
2006, TI 8 will be commissioned with higher intensity in




Before showing the time-line indicating when the differ-
ent protection systems have to be in place and work prop-
erly, issues which might affect the commissioning strategy
are discussed.
Transfer Line Collimators
The setting-up procedures for TCDI centering, align-
ment and beam size measurement for single pass in the
transfer lines have to be defined. A possible single-pass
method for the alignment was already tested during the TI 8
commissioning in 2004. This method is based on a trans-
mission measurement with BCTs and non-local BLMs.
The promising results of the tests can be seen in Fig. 6.
In test phase 3 one of the jaws was moved into the beam
and its tilt was varied by 300 rad. This variation had a
clear effect on the transmitted intensity on the downstream
BCT. For a realistic set-up a complete scan of transmis-
sion versus tilt would have to be carried out with about 10
measurement points. The optimum alignment would then
correspond to the maximum in the obtained transmission
curve [3].
As already mentioned, the TCDIs need the LHC beam



































Figure 6: The transmitted intensity at the BCT at the down-
stream TED in TI 8 during a setting-up test of a collimator.
mode. Thus the whole of the LHC has to be ready, the in-
ject & dump mode working (interplay between sequencer,
timing, BIS etc.) and the beam dump has to be commis-
sioned, before the TCDIs can finally be commissioned with
beam.
The transfer line collimators will be installed in the part
of the transfer line which is already close to the aperture
of the LHC superconducting magnets. Beam losses on
the TCDI during nominal operation, during setting-up of
the collimators or during accidental loss of a full batch
on one collimator jaw could lead to quenches of the adja-
cent LHC magnets. FLUKA simulations were carried out
where 70 m of TI 8 with the adjacent LHC were modeled
and loss scenarios studied, Fig. 7. Preliminary results show
that even for an accidental loss of a full ultimate batch the
LHC magnets do not quench (assuming a quench limit of
38 ). The results for an accidental loss on





Figure 7: The FLUKA model to study losses on the TCDI
and the resulting energy deposition in the adjacent LHC
magnets. In this case a full ultimate batch was lost at TC-
DIV.87804.
TDI
The setting-up procedures for the TDI, the injection
stopper, have not been defined yet. As this diluter is al-
ready in the LHC it can either be set up on the circulating
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Figure 8: Energy deposition in MB.A9R8 for an accidental
loss of a full ultimate batch at TCDIV.87804 in the TI 8
transfer line.
beam or on the injected beam. During the Sector Test it is
(obviously) planned to set it up on injected beam.
The halo load on the TDI from the circulating beam is of
concern. The baseline TDI does not include cooling and the
out-scattered particles could lead to D1 quenches. In case
of unacceptable heat load on the TDI or the D1, retracting
the TDI further might be considered. In this case the TCLI
collimators would be needed earlier than discussed before
to provide sufficient protection of the LHC aperture, see
also [4].
The reproducibility of optics and orbit at the location of
the TDI (TCLI) is an issue and data from the Sector Test is
eagerly awaited. Orbit feedback might be necessary.
The TDI is fixed in the horizontal plane and not much
space is left for the non-injected beam, Fig. 9. The aperture
for the non-injected beam has been validated according to
the standard procedure for LHC apertures, Fig. 10, never-




Figure 9: Cross-section of the TDI.
Figure 10: TDI at IP2: the available aperture for the non-
injected beam corresponds to n1  7.
TCLI
One of the two TCLI collimators per injection inser-
tion, TCLIA, will be installed in an area of the LHC where
both beams share a common beam pipe. A special col-
limator design is required to accommodate two beams in
one collimator tank. The TCLIs are vertical collimators,
TCLIA however will most probably also need to be set up
in the horizontal plane to provide enough aperture for the
other beam. Special setting-up procedures will be required,
where crosstalk between the beams might be of an issue.
Collimator Control System
All movable devices in the LHC and also the transfer line
collimators will eventually be under a common collimator
control system. It is not clear yet when this will be avail-
able. A rudimentary version of this system is required for
the TI 8 tests and the Sector Test towards the end of this
year to be able to test the TCDIs and the TDI.
The interplay of the MCS and the collimator control sys-
tem has to be defined. One question to answer is whether to
store absolute or normalised interlock settings for the col-
limators in the MCS. In the case of normalised settings the
orbit at the device locations might be locally folded into the
interlock setting.
At a later stage automatic setting-up procedures will be
required (e.g. for 43 on 43 bunches). The automatic pro-
cedures developed by the collimation project for the ring
collimators will be reused as much as possible.
Active Protection
Interdependencies are a general issue. As an example,
for the testing of the interlocking functionality of parts of
the surveillance equipment, the MCS and also the SIS have
to be available.
About 15 magnet families involved in the injection pro-
cess have to be equipped with FMCMs to guarantee safe
injection [5, 6]. Three out of the 5 required for CNGS will
be installed for CNGS commissioning, not all are available.
TI 8 needs six in total. Whether TI 8 commissioning with
higher intensity 2006 should/can take place if not all FM-
CMs are ready, has to be clarified.
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Figure 11: Time-line: systems required for the different commissioning stages. Each row is divided into a beam 1 and
a beam 2 row. Colour code: green = installed & prototype test; orange = needed, but may not be fully available; red =
installed & fully operational.
The protection level of the TCDIs depends on the mo-
mentum offset of the extracted beam. Sufficient phase
space coverage can only be guaranteed for a momentum
offset Æ    , due to the partly large dispersion at
the TCDI locations (e.g. TCDIH.87441: 	


  m). An
interlock on the SPS energy has to be in place.
With safe beam intensity, interlock signals like collima-
tor positions can be masked. For the time being the value
for the safe beam intensity is set to     protons at
450 GeV. This leaves more than a factor of 2 margin to
the assumed damage limit for nominal emittance. For runs
with smaller emittance the safe beam intensity will proba-
bly need to be reduced.
SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR THE
DIFFERENT COMMISSIONING STAGES
Fig. 11 shows when the different protection systems have
to be ready. On the left side of the table in Fig. 11 the
systems involved in injection protection can be found and
the top row lists the commissioning stages.
Many injection protection systems will already have to
be operational a long time before the actual start-up of the
LHC due to the tests in 2006, like the CNGS high intensity
commissioning and the Sector Test. The passive protection
devices belong to the last systems becoming fully opera-
tional, as they need the whole LHC ready for the final beam
commissioning.
Discussion
Testing procedures and criteria to declare systems com-
missioned after each commissioning stage have to be de-
fined (e.g. ready for pilot or ready for 43 on 43 bunches).
How and where to represent, store and “move” between
the allowed operating conditions (e.g. maximum current in
the LHC, minimum emittance, number of bunches) has not
been decided yet. A possibility would be to use the MCS to
store the operating conditions for the current commission-
ing stage and the SIS as surveillance system to guarantee
that the previously authorised operating conditions are re-
spected.
CONCLUSIONS
Injection protection must be fully operational for 156
on 156 bunches in commissioning stage I. The main unre-
solved issues concern the machine protection state control
and the passive protection system. For the machine pro-
tection state control the sequencer, the interplay between
sequencer, MCS and SIS and the formalisation of the com-
missioning pathway have to be defined. The passive pro-
tection systems need setting-up procedures and a working
collimator control system.
A lot of important tests of the injection protection system
and procedures can and will be done during the TI 8 tests
in 2006 and the Sector Test. A prerequisite however is that
the TCDIs, the MCS, injection post mortem, the collimator
control system, the injection sequencer for setting up the
TDI, the safe beam intensity flag from the SPS etc. are
available.
REFERENCES
[1] V.Kain, “Safe Injection into the LHC”, Proc. Chamonix XIV,
CERN, Geneva, Switzerland, 2005.
LHC Project Workshop - 'Chamonix XV'
92
[2] R.Bailey, “Summary of Overall Commissioning Strategy for
Protons”, these proceedings.
[3] V.Kain et al., “Beam based Alignment of the LHC Transfer
Line Collimators”, Proc. PAC 2005, Knoxville, Tennessee,
USA.
[4] G.Robert-Demolaize, “Critical Beam Losses during Com-
missioning and Initial Operation”, these proceedings.
[5] V.Kain et al., “Protection Level during Extraction, Transfer
and Injection into the LHC”, Proc. PAC 2005, Knoxville,
Tennessee, USA.
[6] M.Zerlauth et al., “Requirements for the Fast Magnet Cur-
rent Change Monitors (FMCM) in the LHC and the SPS-LHC
Transfer Lines”, LHC-CIW-ES-0002-00-10, CERN, Geneva,
Switzerland, 2005.
LHC Project Workshop - 'Chamonix XV'
93
